Democracy in America: Chapter 7 Summary & Analysis

Turning his attention to the 13 American colonies before the revolution, Tocqueville identifies two opposite tendencies: a tendency toward unity and a tendency toward independence. Each colony proclaimed its own sovereignty, such that there was no security against common dangers, or ability to pay the debt owed as a result of war. America had owed much of its war victory to its geographical position alone, but now it was forced to look inward and revise its first constitution in a convention led by the first President, George Washington.

In 1789, the new Federal government began and the American revolution officially ended (the same year as the revolution in France began). The difficult question of how to balance sovereignty and unity still had to be resolved: the Convention gave some powers to the federal government and left all else to the states, establishing a Federal court to maintain this balance. The careful division of powers led to both a system of federalism and, simultaneously, a highly centralized government. Yet while the powers of the president are great, given the isolation of the country, he has little chance to enact such powers.

Tocqueville argues that the limited powers given to people in America also work to limit their desires—Americans being generally more content and tranquil than others. In a small country, he says, tyranny is more frightening because a tyrant’s power spreads throughout the country, but Tocqueville also notes that small places are more likely to be free, if only because tyrannical individuals are less likely to be tempted by the prospect of ruling over an unimpressively-sized land.

In turn, many small nations lose their freedom once they grow. Not a single great nation has maintained republican government for a long period of time.  As states grow, ambitions grow as well, though unaccompanied by an increase in patriotism. Together with extreme inequality, large capital cities, and antagonism of interests, these dangers stem from great size in a democracy (while in monarchies, large numbers only increase their power). Vast empires, Tocqueville concludes, only work against freedom and well-being. 

Still, Tocqueville also acknowledges the advantages of size: individual greatness becomes more likely when there is greater glory to strive for, leading to more knowledge, ideas, and aptitude in war. Even if the world would be better off if only small nations existed, given the unavoidable existence of large nations, it’s better to be large, if only so nations can defend themselves against other strong countries. Small nations always end up being yoked to large empires, whether by force or will.

Tocqueville returns to the advantage of America’s federalist system, by which Congress regulates the national government and provincial legislatures manage local details of administration. Each small community has different needs, so the spirit of improvement is kept alive—unlike in South America, where large republics have prevented such improvement.

Tocqueville notes that the national public spirit in America is really only an aggregate of patriotism applied to each province. Americans defend their nation because they want to defend their own state or county’s prosperity. Still, while America is a great nation in size, its administration is more like that of a small nation, in which desires for fame and power are limited, and there are no massive capital cities or great inequalities of wealth. At the same time, objects and ideas circulate freely throughout the land.

Tocqueville characterizes war as the most important testing ground for a nation’s power and spirit. Given that there is no centralized administration in America, and only an imperfectly organized central government with a tendency toward weakness, he asks why America is not harmed by a great war—and responds that its physical isolation means it has no wars to fear from Europe, while Canada and Mexico are not real threats.

In sum, Tocqueville admires the federalist system, but he doesn’t imagine that it can be easily replicated anywhere other than in the US—European nations would become weak and susceptible to threats by highly centralized nations, while America luckily escapes such a menace.