Wisdom, Action, and Justification Theme Analysis

In Plato’s Euthyphro, the title character Euthyphro explains that he is prosecuting his own father for murdering a slave that murdered another slave in a drunken range. Euthyphro’s father bound the murderous slave and left him in a ditch whilst waiting for official advice on what to do with the slave. In the meantime, the slave died from hunger, exposure, and his bonds. Euthyphro is pressing charges because he believes his father acted impiously in virtue of causing the slave’s death. Socrates, meanwhile, is at the magistrates’ court because Meletus is charging him with impiety for corrupting youths with ideas that are irreverent towards the gods. Despite all these declarations of impiety, Plato—by way of Socrates—implies that one’s actions aren’t justified as “pious” unless they have a philosophical understanding of piety.

Socrates asks Euthyphro for a definition of piety under the tongue-in-cheek guise of needing one to defend himself in his own case against Meletus, who rests his charge against Socrates on some notion of irreverence against the gods’ wishes. Euthyphro, too, associates piety with the gods’ wishes, but he is unable to satisfy Socrates with a concrete definition that fleshes out what this exactly means. When Euthyphro tries to associate piety with whatever the gods “love” or “desire,” or what “pleases all the gods,” Socrates pushes him to say exactly what such a thing could be. But every time Euthyphro tries to offer tangible examples, he runs into problems. When Euthyphro says the gods would approve of prosecuting one’s father because some gods have done “similar things,” Socrates argues that other gods might disapprove—this means Euthyphro can't say for sure that “all the gods definitely believe this action to be right.” When Euthyphro suggests that offering sacrifices to the gods, or acting with “honor” and “reverence" to the gods services godly needs, Socrates argues that humans can’t be sure what the gods aim to do, and what, therefore they need to accomplish such aims. Euthyphro agrees that it “is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things.” Both prosecutors associate piety with the gods’ desires or wishes, but the dialogue shows that it’s difficult to know exactly what these are—without this wisdom, it is impossible to justify what exactly defines a pious or impious action.

Socrates believes the overall problem with associating piety with something that the gods love rests in the fact that godly wishes or desires are not something humans can possibly know. Socrates raises this point with characteristic irony: "If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men but now I know well that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not hide what you think it is.” With this, Socrates begins to flesh out the idea that one can’t act piously if they do not have the knowledge of what, exactly, piety is.

The dialogue suggests that a charge of impiety is justified if the prosecutor knows, exactly, what piety is. Based on Euthyphro’s several failed attempts at defining piety in a way that satisfies Socrates, it’s clear that he doesn’t understand piety on a more fundamental level. Euthyphro simply feels he is being pious. He may, in fact, be acting piously, but without the ability to offer an explanation of what piety is, he cannot prove it. Since none of Euthyphro's attempts to associate piety with the gods and their aims, wishes, or desires have escaped scrutiny, Plato is implying that Euthyphro’s charge against his father is not justified, and neither—by extension—is Meletus’ charge against Socrates. In other words, an action cannot be pious unless the person committing the action can articulate “clear knowledge of piety and impiety.” More broadly, Plato implies that any action (for example, acting “lovingly” or “virtuously”) cannot be justified without wisdom of the concept (such as “love” or “virtue”) that the action relies on.