For the authors of The Federalist Papers, the United States Constitution symbolizes a decisive break from the failures of the Articles of Confederation and the beginning of a stronger, more unified nation. Whereas the Articles of the Confederation represent disorder, inefficiency, and ineffective governance, the Constitution stands as a symbol of renewal and national stability. In The Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay argue that the Articles have left the country weak, vulnerable to foreign threats, and paralyzed by internal divisions. They present the Constitution, in contrast, as a transformative document, one that ushers in a new era of centralized authority, economic prosperity, and functional governance. Madison, in Federalist No. 10 and No. 51, uses the Constitution as proof that government can be structured to control factions and balance power without descending into tyranny. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 23–36, portrays it as the only means to provide for defense, taxation, and commerce, replacing the ineffectual system that left the country in economic ruin. Jay, in Federalist No. 2, sees it as a unifying force that will preserve America’s independence by preventing the states from fragmenting. In their eyes, the Constitution is more than law—it is a symbol of progress, ensuring that the United States can govern itself without succumbing to the chaos of its past and the tyranny from which it escaped.
The United States Constitution Quotes in The Federalist Papers
Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded.
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Get LitCharts A+The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted. Our governments are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing numbers only, but upon a calculation of the proper number of inhabitants, which the territory may contain. We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World.
We may indeed, with propriety, be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not experience. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights.
The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good.
The proposed Constitution […] is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation, it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national.
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, such as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of power, or with a tendency to such accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.
Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the slave as divested of two fifths of the man.
The judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive holds the sword of the community, the legislature commands the purse […]. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.
