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Chapter 8
Themes
Key
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in How Democracies Die, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
American Tyranny
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms
Extremism and Gatekeeping
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy
Global and Historical Patterns
Summary
Analysis
Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that U.S. democracy is heading toward collapse because rising polarization since the 1960s has led to an “epidemic of norm breaking.” They reject the popular idea that democracy is receding across the globe—while many countries’ democracies are declining, just as many are strengthening, and most are perfectly intact. With many exceptions, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has focused on promoting democracy and fighting authoritarianism. But Trump neither promotes democracy nor effectively models it for the world, so he may help democracy decline globally.
Levitsky and Ziblatt repeat their book’s central thesis: polarization has weakened democratic norms, which threatens U.S. democracy. Donald Trump is both a cause and effect of this process—polarization made his presidency possible, but he has also significantly worsened it. In other words, the U.S.’s slide toward authoritarianism preceded Trump’s presidency, but Trump has also sped it up. The authors also point out that international democratic norms can be as important as domestic ones, like tolerance and forbearance. Just as Levitsky and Ziblatt have used international examples to illustrate the dangers in Trump’s behavior, politicians around the world will look at Trump for an indication of what they can get away with.
Themes
Levitsky and Ziblatt envision three different ways that the U.S. can come out of Trump’s presidency. First, if Trump becomes widely unpopular, loses re-election, or gets removed from office, American democracy could quickly bounce back. The Democrats could undo his policies and pass new reforms to strengthen democracy, while the Republicans could give up on their extremism. While this is the best-case scenario, it’s not likely, because polarization was already increasing and norms were already falling apart for decades before Trump’s rise to power.
Levitsky and Ziblatt wrote this book in the first year of Trump’s presidency. At this time, U.S. democracy’s fate was still extremely uncertain, as they note here. Their optimistic scenario would likely require significant Republican opposition to Trump, effective gatekeeping in the future, and a strong popular commitment to overcoming polarization and reinforcing democratic norms. But this scenario shows that, during and after the Trump era, Americans still have the power to save their democracy. Therefore, through this scenario, Levitsky and Ziblatt also encourage activists and politicians to fight for American democracy.
Themes
Second, led by Trump, the Republicans might keep winning elections, consolidate power through constitutional hardball, and implement a white nationalist agenda that keeps the U.S. electorate majority white. The Trump administration is already contemplating this agenda, which would be “profoundly antidemocratic” and probably lead to significant resistance—or even widespread violence and police repression. This scenario is also unlikely, but it’s possible—in countries like Lebanon and Israel, declining majorities have used war and oppression to keep power. Of course, white supremacists governed the Southern U.S. in the same way for almost a century.
Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that this “profoundly antidemocratic” pessimistic scenario is a reflection of the Republican Party’s existing political strategy—one based on racial exclusion. This strategy has historical precedents in the South, and it would involve repeating some of the darkest moments from U.S. history. Levitsky and Ziblatt use this scenario to remind their readers that history isn’t always a story of progress and inclusion—instead, different forces are fighting to move the nation forward and hold it back. The authors’ reference to Lebanon and Israel also shows how unique the U.S.’s challenge is: few multiracial democracies, if any, have successfully transitioned from majority rule to inclusive, cooperative government.
Themes
Third and most likely, the U.S. might end up in a polarized system of “democracy without solid guardrails.” Levitsky and Ziblatt point to North Carolina as an example of how this would look. It’s a relatively wealthy, diverse, politically split state. It has become a partisan battleground, with state politics polarized over issues like abortion, Medicaid, and transgender people’s rights in public bathrooms.
In a hyper-polarized nation “without solid guardrails,” authoritarianism will not necessarily replace democracy—but it will always be on the horizon, just one step away. In such a nation, as in North Carolina, democratic norms wouldn’t deter or stop autocratic behavior. Therefore, both parties would be constantly trying to rig the game in their favor, and the side that succeeded would get to rule with virtually unchecked power.
Themes
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In 2010, North Carolina’s Republican-controlled state legislature gerrymandered electoral districts to ensure that it maintained a large majority. In 2012, Republicans won nine of the state’s thirteen congressional seats, despite receiving a minority of the vote. State Republican legislators collected demographic data on voters, then passed a series of new voting restrictions to exclusively target Black voters. When the courts ordered them to freeze the laws, they ignored the courts. And when a Democrat won the governorship, they considered overturning the election and passed a series of laws to limit the governor’s power instead. With Republicans increasingly willing to grab and consolidate power by any means necessary, the nation may soon look like North Carolina.
North Carolina’s politics is decreasingly democratic, because its politicians decreasingly represent their constituents. First, gerrymandering has given a Republican minority disproportionate power and effectively disenfranchised large groups of mostly Black voters. Second, while North Carolina voters are relatively diverse and politically moderate, state politics are increasingly extreme and one-sided. Rather than cooperating to produce laws that reflect the will and needs of the state’s actual voters, the two parties go to ever-greater lengths to seize power and pass the most extreme policies they can get away with. They have all but abandoned mutual toleration and institutional forbearance.
Themes
Levitsky and Ziblatt return to one of their book’s key lessons: in the U.S., democracy has depended on the key norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. The founders thought that well-designed institutions would be enough to stop tyranny, but they were wrong. To function, institutions need informal, shared rules—or norms. Americans recognize freedom and equality as key national values, but they should view toleration and forbearance the same way.
Levitsky and Ziblatt differ from the founders because they think that the people who run institutions—and especially their intentions and values—have greater consequences for democracy than those institutions’ structure. Institutions can only protect democracy when politicians use them correctly, and their willingness to do so depends on democratic norms. Elevating toleration and forbearance to the same level as freedom and equality is one way to help the public understand, appreciate, and reinforce democracy.
Themes
Many progressive Americans believe that the Democrats should “fight like Republicans” in order to win—they think that the Democrats will lose if they play by the rules while the Republicans ignore them. To stop Donald Trump, some Democrats proposed obstructing all Republican legislation, challenging the 2016 election results, or launching impeachment proceedings right away.
To some Democrats, playing dirty (or “fight[ing] like Republicans”) might seem like the only way they can pass their agenda. However, if Democrats resort to power in order to restore democracy, they would likely do so through anti-democratic means. If both these premises are true, they suggest that Democrats have to attack democracy now in order to save it later. Levitsky and Ziblatt are sympathetic to this line of thinking, but they think it’s wrong.
Themes
Levitsky and Ziblatt reject these ideas. If the Democrats play dirty, they argue, moderates will abandon them and Republicans will unite to crack down on them. When Hugo Chávez’s opponents tried to oust him through a coup, general strike, and election boycott, they actually destroyed their own credibility and gave Chávez a justification for persecuting them. In contrast, in Colombia, democratic forces prevented Álvaro Uribe from running for a third term by focusing on winning over the legislature and judiciary. If the Democrats push Trump out through hardball, the government they inherit will lack democratic norms. Partisanship and polarization would only increase.
Levitsky and Ziblatt believe that if Democrats “fight like Republicans,” they may or may not win power in the short term, but they’ll almost certainly help destroy democracy in the long term. For the authors, democracy’s long-term health is always more important. The contrast between Chávez and Uribe’s outcomes suggests that pro-democracy forces should take the moral high ground against authoritarians, even if it seems unlikely to produce an immediate, decisive victory.
Themes
Instead of copying Republican tactics, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the Democrats should focus on reinforcing democratic norms and winning back power through institutions. When they protest, they should strive to support democratic rights and institutions, not challenge them. While it’s important for Democrats to build progressive coalitions with diverse groups, it’s even more important for them to build pro-democracy coalitions with conservative adversaries, like evangelical leaders and corporate executives. Such coalitions can appeal to a broader range of voters, fight polarization, and build mutual toleration.
Levitsky and Ziblatt emphasize that it’s impossible to impose democracy on a society all at once. Instead, democratization is always a gradual process—after all, it requires buy-in from as much of the population as possible. Therefore, pro-democracy forces can’t restore democracy simply by gaining power. But they can start restoring democracy by building up the norms and institutions that it requires to function. The authors propose building coalitions between progressives and conservatives because such coalitions can push for democratic reforms and rebuild democratic norms like toleration at the same time.
Themes
In fact, Trump’s abuses of power aren’t “the fundamental problem facing American democracy”—partisan polarization is. Politicians can lead the people to unity by first building alliances among themselves. Chilean politicians did this during the Pinochet dictatorship. Although they were enemies during the period of escalating tensions that killed Chilean democracy, the Socialists and conservative Christian Democrats worked together to defeat the dictatorship and reinstate democracy. For decades thereafter, they continued to consult with one another—and even their pro-Pinochet opponents—on all new legislation. However, Levitsky and Ziblatt doubt that this strategy would work in the U.S.
Removing Trump from office wouldn’t solve polarization, but solving polarization would make Trump an unelectable candidate. Therefore, Levitsky and Ziblatt dedicate the rest of their conclusion to exploring solutions to this “fundamental problem.” The example from Chile shows how politicians can take the lead in fighting polarization. Chile’s opposing parties found a common enemy in the military dictator, Pinochet. But this is unlikely to happen in the U.S. because one of the two major parties will likely always be aligned with the president. Therefore, collaboration among politicians is unlikely to solve polarization and restore democracy. Instead, the U.S. needs to look at structural and grassroots solutions.
Themes
Rather than waiting for politicians to cooperate despite polarization, the U.S. has to defeat polarization. Political scientists have proposed many policy remedies, but Levitsky and Ziblatt think that it would be more effective to address racial, religious, and economic forces in American society. The Republican Party’s extreme tactics and ideological shift have primarily driven this polarization. In particular, conservative media and wealthy donors have driven this shift. They have more power over Republican politicians than the party leadership does. So Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the party needs to be reformed. Leadership must retake control of the party’s “finance, grassroots organization, messaging, and candidate selection.” They should make the party more diverse and expel extremists.
Where the Chilean solution won’t work in the U.S., Levitsky and Ziblatt propose a series of other solutions instead. First, they propose moderating the Republican Party through better gatekeeping. This requires that Republican leaders who are committed to democratic norms first regain financial, ideological, and organizational control of their party. Only then can they expel extremists from it and ensure that both main parties support democracy. However, giving Republican leaders control over the party again will first require major structural reforms to the U.S. political system. It remains to be seen whether establishment conservatives have the power and resources necessary to enact them.
Themes
Refounding the Republican Party sounds extremely difficult, but in the past, conservative parties have successfully rebuilt democracies by rebuilding themselves. For instance, before the end of World War II, Germany’s conservative parties were always either extremist or disorganized. But after the war, anti-Nazi conservatives founded the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a tolerant center-right party that embraced both Catholics and Protestants. Like the CDU, the Republican Party can choose democracy over extremism and appeal to more voters besides white Christians. However, the CDU only rebuilt itself in response to a catastrophe, and the authors ask if the Republican Party will be able to do the same without a profound crisis.
The German CDU shows how it’s possible for the political establishment to rebuild its gatekeeping capacities and create public trust in democratic norms. It also shows how conservative parties can be diverse and inclusive. But just like the Chilean example, the German example might not apply to the U.S.—the stakes may not be high enough for the Republican Party. Still, Levitsky and Ziblatt hope that enough Republicans will see how Trump and the far-right threaten their establishment’s continued existence.
Themes
The Democrats can also help decrease polarization by focusing less attention on ethnic minority voters. But Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that “this is a terrible idea.” From its founding until the 1960s, the U.S. political system was based on antidemocratic racial exclusion. Instead of repeating its mistakes, it should strive to create an equitable multiethnic democracy.
Next, Levitsky and Ziblatt look at how the Democrats can address polarization. If the Democrats pivot to focusing on white voters and take energy and resources away from minority populations, they will recreate the exclusionary, white supremacist political system that predominated in the U.S. until the civil rights movement. It’s true that polarization and diversity have grown together, but this doesn’t mean that solving polarization requires rejecting diversity.
Themes
Levitsky and Ziblatt propose that Democrats should fight polarization by addressing the nation’s growing economic inequality (which has fueled the social resentment that underlies partisan polarization). Instead of using means-tested programs that only give benefits to certain people, the Democrats should implement universal social policies that can appeal to voters across the partisan spectrum. Examples of such programs include universal healthcare, a higher minimum wage, a universal basic income, paid parental leave, daycare, better job training, and work-study programs. Passing these programs will be difficult, but American democracy depends on them.
Levitsky and Ziblatt propose universal social policies because they believe such programs promise to simultaneously do the two things that U.S. politics sorely need: they can remake the party system and restore faith in democratic norms and institutions. They can remake the party system by helping Democrats win votes from everyone whom their policies benefit, including the white working class. If these policies succeed, then racial, religious, and ideological affiliation will no longer form the core of party politics in the U.S. These policies can also restore faith in democracy by showing Americans how public policy can actually improve their lives—but only if the government reflects the people’s will and acts to meet their needs.
Themes
Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude that the U.S.’s situation is similar to other countries’ democratic crises throughout history. American democracy depends on U.S. citizens’ ability to restore basic norms and extend them across racial and ethnic lines.
Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the U.S.’s democratic crisis isn’t totally unprecedented, but it is unique in some important ways. Examples from other countries and U.S. history show that it’s possible for the U.S. to reestablish democratic norms and overcome this crisis. But the U.S. also faces the unique challenge of doing so in a diverse, multiracial democracy. Inclusivity and polarization have been bound together in the past, and Americans must find a way to separate them in the future.
Themes
