Lone Survivor: Chapter 7 Summary & Analysis

The SEALs have a huge disadvantage: they’re not used to navigating up and down a steep mountain (whereas the Taliban soldiers who they’re likely to encounter have probably spent a long time in the mountains). Luttrell and some of the other SEALs are uncomfortable with climbing, and expend too much energy during this stage of the mission.

Again, secrecy is a crucial element of Operation Redwing: if the SEALs’ position becomes known to the Taliban soldiers, they won’t have a chance of defending themselves, since they’re badly outnumbered.

The three goatherds seem not to mean the SEALs any harm, but it’s possible that they could inform the Taliban of the SEALs’ presence, throwing the entire mission into jeopardy. (Though Gulab would later claim that locals were already aware of the SEALs at this point, and actually watched them interacting with the goatherds.)

Luttrell presents the ethical dilemma the SEALs face: kill the goatherds and protect themselves, or let the goatherds go and risk being massacred themselves. Notice that Luttrell claims that the correct “military” decision would be to kill the goatherds. However, this decision doesn’t factor in the moral issues involved with murdering three unarmed people, one of whom is just a teenager. And because there are only four SEALs, it isn’t even really a question of numbers—it’s basically a question of which lives matter more in Luttrell’s eyes.

The SEALs all sense that if they let the goatherds go, they’ll face the wrath of the Taliban. However, they’re reluctant to kill innocent, unarmed people—even though they know it might be most effective for their mission (although later accounts, even from Luttrell himself, stressed how difficult it would be to hide the goats, even if they did kill the goatherds). Two very important things to notice here: 1) Luttrell claims the goatherds pose a clear and present danger to the mission. This is debatable: the goatherds haven’t shown any intention of harming the SEALS, and any threat they pose in the event of informing the Taliban may be clear, but it’s not “present” by any stretch of the English language (and furthermore, the Taliban may have already been aware of the SEALs even before this encounter). 2) The SEALs are afraid of the media fallout in the event that they kill the goatherds. This partly explains why Luttrell is so against “liberal media elites”—he sees them as direct threats to his friends’ safety.

This is a genuine moral dilemma, for which there’s no easy answer. Some would say that the SEALs are justified in preserving their own lives, since there’s a very strong possibility that the goatherds will go to the Taliban. Others would argue that taking the life of an unarmed civilian is never the right thing to do—the ends never justify the means.

Luttrell allows the goatherds to go, but in retrospect he considers this stupid. Luttrell’s experiences in Afghanistan have taught him to consider unarmed civilians almost as dangerous as armed terrorists—which perhaps explains why he’s so opposed to the ROE that protect unarmed civilians. (Though some, on the other hand, might consider this decision even more heroic than the firefight that follows, since it shows true moral principle, rather than just violence in the face of other violence.) It’s also later been disputed that this “vote” occurred at all—other military officials have said that it would have been extremely unlikely for a commanding officer to allow a “vote” on whether or not to execute unarmed civilians. Instead, the officer (Mikey, in this case), would have just made the decision and the others would have gone along with it.

It’s implied that the goatherds go to the Taliban and inform them of the SEALs’ position. The SEALs have chosen to respect the lives of unarmed civilians—and, tragically, they’re now paying the penalty for their decision. Once again, though, it’s important to keep in mind Gulab’s later assertion that the Taliban already knew the SEALs were there before they encountered the goatherds, and so the goatherds might have been altogether blameless. Luttrell has also been accused of exaggerating the number of Taliban soldiers—his official report, as well as later intelligence reports from Taliban operatives, suggest that as few as a ten or twenty insurgents showed up, armed with RPGs and other lethal weapons.

Luttrell endures tremendous physical pain after retreating from the Taliban soldiers, but he also experiences some almost miraculous good luck (at least as he describes it, from his memories of an extremely traumatic—and therefore possibly distorted—experience), since he doesn’t lose his gun. The terrain seems just as antagonistic to the SEALs as the Taliban are.

Luttrell emphasizes the Taliban soldiers’ numbers and superior firepower, as well as their tactical advantage and their expert military training—in short, the Taliban outmatch the SEALs in virtually every way, even taking into account the SEALs’ expert training.

Even in the heat of battle, Luttrell remembers his SEAL training, and feels a strong sense of responsibility to his fallen friends. Luttrell’s close bond to his fellow SEALs makes these battlefield losses all the more poignant.

Luttrell is the least injured of the SEALs, and he’s also the team medic, but he has no way of helping his friends. Furthermore, the constant gunfire from the Taliban means that Luttrell may not have had the time to care for his friends even if he did have his supplies.

Again, Luttrell emphasizes the large number of Taliban soldiers fighting the SEALs (a detail that’s been challenged since the book was published). It’s not just that the SEALs are outnumbered, however; rather, it’s that they’re outnumbered, outgunned, have an inferior tactical position, and lack the element of surprise. In short, they have just about every disadvantage a group of soldiers could possibly have.