Language, Rhetoric, and Reasoning Theme Analysis

In Meno, Socrates is interested in simply exploring ideas alongside his interlocutor (the person he is in dialogue with). Whereas in Apology he tries to persuade the Athenian jury not to condemn him, in this dialogue he focuses on investigating the claims that both Meno and he himself make. Interestingly enough, though, he makes use of the same process of conversational cross-examination that he employs in Plato’s other dialogues, ultimately using this method to challenge what Meno takes for granted in his arguments. Because of his desire to conduct a productive dialogue in which both he and Meno make their way toward valuable realizations, Socrates pays close attention to the language they use, making sure to reduce each statement to its simplest, most straightforward formulation. In doing so, he demonstrates how important it is to interrogate one’s own beliefs and the ways in which one presents those beliefs. What’s more, when Socrates abandons his normal format of cross-examination in order to apply critical pressure to his own hypotheses, readers see that he is willing to scrutinize himself as thoroughly as he scrutinizes anyone else. In this way, he proves that he is interested first and foremost in participating in a worthwhile, logically sound discussion, which is why he has no problem holding himself to the same argumentative standards to which he holds everyone else.

Early in their conversation, Socrates urges Meno to articulate how, exactly, he would define virtue. Already, then, it becomes apparent that Socrates thinks their discussion will be most productive if they first linguistically ground themselves. He understands the importance of using the clearest language available, for this will later enable him and Meno to articulate more nuanced ideas. In other words, Socrates believes that using straightforward language makes it easier to grasp complicated ideas.

But Meno struggles to hit upon a solid definition of virtue, eventually suggesting that it is “to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.” In response, Socrates asks if Meno means that “the man who desires beautiful things desires good things,” and Meno says that this is indeed what he means. Going on, Socrates asks if people ever desire “bad things” even when they know these things are bad. “Certainly I do,” Meno says. At this point, Socrates poses an important question, one that showcases his fondness for linguistic precision. “What do you mean by desiring? Is it to secure for oneself?” he asks. When Meno says yes, Socrates proceeds to outline the following: since “bad things” harm people, and no one actively wants to be harmed, then it can’t be true that anyone would ever “desire”—or want to “secure”—a “bad thing,” for by doing so they would knowingly harm themselves. In this way, Socrates reveals a flaw in Meno’s argument, one that hinges upon his failure to fully consider the implications of the language he employs. After all, if he had more carefully thought about the word “desire,” he likely wouldn’t have set forth this faulty definition of virtue in the first place.

Socrates’s sensitivity to linguistic accuracy is also evident in the examples he uses to support his points. For instance, when Meno tries to define what virtue is by pointing to various traits that he considers virtuous, Socrates tries to impress upon him that this is an inadequate way to define something. In order to make this point, he considers the concept of “shape,” saying that although a circle is a shape, it doesn’t define the entire concept of shape itself. He then offers a straightforward and geometrically sound definition of shape, one that applies to all kinds of shapes, thereby laying the groundwork for more complex investigations into geometry. In the same way that this attention to linguistic detail might provide the basis for a more in-depth discussion of shape, it becomes clear that any valid investigation into the nature of virtue must include a careful definition of virtue itself.

For the first half of his conversation with Meno, Socrates cross-examines him as a way of showing him the faults in his arguments. This follows the traditional model of all Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates peppers people with questions until they realize that their original statements are logically unsound. However, in this dialogue, Socrates transitions to a different kind of philosophical investigation, one in which he poses a number of hypotheses and then methodically walks through them until they are disproven. Of course, he only does this because Meno insists upon considering whether or not virtue can be taught even though they haven’t yet established what virtue is. Going along with this, Socrates formulates a hypothesis that if virtue is a kind of knowledge, then it can be taught, since all knowledge is teachable (or “recollectable”). He then goes step by step through this hypothesis, and though his specific points are too numerous to outline here, what matters most is that he determines that the hypothesis is wrong, for if virtue were knowledge, there would certainly be people who taught it to others, and since there are none, then virtue must not be knowledge after all.

Meno, though, has trouble accepting that the original hypothesis is wrong, since it seemed so logically sound to him when he and Socrates first formulated it. “We should not only think it right at the time [of its formulation],” Socrates advises, “but also now and in the future if it is to be at all sound.” As such, Socrates underlines the importance of fully and mercilessly examining one’s own suppositions, ultimately demonstrating that a person can and should interrogate their own ideas even when they appear to be solid. Indeed, this is the same kind of careful scrutiny that Socrates applies to language. Furthermore, Socrates has now made use of a new rhetorical move, one that doesn’t depend upon cross-examining his interlocutor, but posing difficult questions to himself, thereby demonstrating that people are capable of holding themselves to high standards when it comes to formulating logically sound ideas.