In Phaedo, Socrates examines the nature of wisdom, using the process of learning to argue not only for the immortality of the soul, but also for the overall benefit of the life of the mind. Having drawn a clear distinction between the body and the soul, he says that philosophers prepare themselves for death by paying attention only to intellectual pursuits, which he asserts continue beyond death. Knowledge and wisdom, Socrates maintains, have the power to “purify” a person’s soul upon death, and any good philosopher should aim to achieve this purification—which will only lead to the attainment of more wisdom and truth in the afterlife. Accordingly, he claims that one of the main goals of philosophers is to “prepare” for death, since this is how they will finally gain the knowledge they have been searching for all along. This viewpoint frames true wisdom as somewhat elusive in the realm of the living, since Socrates suggests that only in death will philosophers come upon the knowledge they have pursued in life. In order to make this happen, though, one must reach toward wisdom while still alive, purging oneself of corporeal distractions. As such, Socrates portrays the pursuit of knowledge in life as inherently worthwhile, even if true wisdom only comes with death.
It’s important to understand that Socrates believes that body and soul are separate from one another. Taking this viewpoint, he devalues human sensory perception (such as sight and hearing) because he thinks corporeal methods of observation make it impossible to ever “grasp the truth.” This, he maintains, is because “whenever [the soul] attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it.” Rather than depending upon the physical senses to gather knowledge, Socrates believes “reasoning” is what gets a person closest to “the truth.” When Socrates champions the process of “reasoning,” he prioritizes intellectual thought above all else. The soul, he thinks, should immerse itself in a vacuum of philosophical analysis. By outlining this belief, he implies that the pursuit of knowledge ought to be a person’s top priority in life.
What’s more, Socrates focuses so intently on the attainment of knowledge because he believes it is intrinsically good. “With [wisdom] we have real courage and moderation and justice and, in a word, true virtue,” he says. He argues that a knowledge-based approach to life, which concerns itself only with the attainment of wisdom, will help a person achieve “true virtue,” adding that “wisdom itself is a kind of cleansing or purification.” The “purification” of the soul that wisdom brings about is one of the main reasons Socrates values the life of the mind so much: he believes this “purification” determines one’s fate in the afterlife. “Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body;” he says, adding that “they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places” than those who don’t devote themselves to the pursuit of knowledge. In this way, readers see that Socrates’s commitment to wisdom is wrapped up in his belief that philosophical thinking is rewarded in the afterlife. In turn, the attainment of knowledge isn’t just a simple gathering of information, but a cultivation of “virtue” and the divine.
Socrates’s investment in the connection between wisdom and the afterlife also emerges when he uses The Theory of Recollection to prove the soul’s immortality. According to this theory (which Socrates also outlines in Meno), humans don’t learn new information, but simply recollect knowledge the soul has already acquired in a past life. Socrates explains this by pointing out that his listeners understand certain concepts even without necessarily encountering actual manifestations of those concepts in real life. For instance, he says that Simmias grasps “the Equal” when he looks at two objects that are similar in size, even if those two objects aren’t exactly the same. This, Socrates says, is proof that Simmias possesses a prior understanding of “the Equal,” since he’s able to “recollect” the concept of equality. In turn, this suggests that his soul contains a wealth of knowledge that it accumulated before Simmias was born—proof that it is, indeed, immortal. Once again, then, Socrates’s approach to the attainment of knowledge influences his beliefs regarding the afterlife, thereby helping him underline why it’s worth examining the nature of wisdom.
For all of Socrates’s confidence, he nonetheless acknowledges that he might not be right about everything he says regarding the afterlife. After providing a lengthy description of the various paths souls take after death, he says, “No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places […].” Saying this, he admits that it’s impossible to speculate about such unknowable matters. At the same time, though, his opinion that it’s worth believing what he’s said frames the very pursuit of knowledge as an innately noble one, especially since it might encourage a person to “seriously concern himself with the pleasures of learning.” Ultimately, Socrates presents philosophical thought as a deeply worthwhile endeavor, even though a person won’t encounter true wisdom until after death.
Knowledge and Wisdom ThemeTracker
Knowledge and Wisdom Quotes in Phaedo
Simmias and Cebes, I should be wrong not to resent dying if I did not believe that I should go first to other wise and good gods, and then to men who have died and are better than men are here. Be assured that, as it is, I expect to join the company of good men. This last I would not altogether insist on, but if I insist on anything at all in these matters, it is that I shall come to gods who are very good masters. That is why I am not so resentful, because I have good hope that some future awaits men after death, as we have been told for years, a much better future for the good than for the wicked.
It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death. Then and not before, the soul is by itself apart from the body.
[…] the only valid currency […] is wisdom. With this we have real courage and moderation and justice and, in a word, true virtue, with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all such things be present or absent.
Socrates, [Cebes] said, everything else you said is excellent, I think, but men find it very hard to believe what you said about the soul. They think that after it has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man dies, as soon as it leaves the body; and that, on leaving it, it is dispersed like breath or smoke, has flown away and gone and is no longer anything anywhere.
Let us examine it in some such a manner as this: whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not. We recall an ancient theory that souls arriving there come from here, and then again that they arrive here and are born here from the dead. If that is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls must exist there, for they could not come back if they did not exist, and this is a sufficient proof that these things are so if it truly appears that the living never come from any other source than from the dead. If this is not the case we should need another argument.
There is one excellent argument, said Cebes, namely that when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the knowledge and the right explanation inside them. Then if one shows them a diagram or something else of that kind, this will show most clearly that such is the case.
Consider, he said, whether this is the case: We say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?
Indeed we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most definitely.
And do we know what this is? — Certainly.
Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them? Or doesn’t it seem to you to be different?
It is as when one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false—as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not—and so with another argument and then another. You know how those in particular who spend their time studying contradiction in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is no soundness or reliability in any object or in any argument, but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down […] and does not remain in the same place for any time at all.
No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale. That is the reason why a man should be of good cheer about his own soul, if during life he has ignored the pleasures of the body and its ornamentation as of no concern to him and doing him more harm than good, but has seriously concerned himself with the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul not with alien but with its own ornaments, namely, moderation, righteousness, courage, freedom, and truth, and in that state awaits his journey to the underworld.
“Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him and do not forget.” — “It shall be done,” said Crito, “tell us if there is anything else.” But there was no answer.