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Introduction
Themes
Key
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in How Democracies Die, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
American Tyranny
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms
Extremism and Gatekeeping
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy
Global and Historical Patterns
Summary
Analysis
Levitsky and Ziblatt quote one of Aesop’s fables: the Horse asks the Hunter to help him conquer the Stag, and the Hunter agrees, on the condition that he can saddle up and ride the Horse. But after the Hunter kills the Stag, he refuses to get off the Horse.
In this fable, the Hunter is the authoritarian, the Horse is the establishment, and killing the Stag represents winning power through elections. The fable represents the way authoritarians take power: they promise establishment politicians short-term political gain in exchange for their support. But in the long term, establishment politicians end up handing power to the authoritarian.
Themes
In October 1922, Benito Mussolini traveled to Rome to become the premier of Italy. Famously, he visited the king dressed in black, then led thousands of Blackshirts (Fascist paramilitary gangs) as they paraded through the city, proclaiming revolution. At least, that’s the myth—in reality, there was no revolution. Italy was politically divided and the Blackshirts were threatening violence. King Victor Emmanuel III thought he could restore order by giving Mussolini power. At first, it worked—but soon, like the horse from Aesop’s fable, Italy was under Mussolini’s control.
The difference between the myth and the reality of Mussolini’s rule shows why it’s so important to accurately understand history. The myth makes it seem as though Mussolini was all-powerful and unstoppable. But the reality is that he wasn’t very powerful at all, and he could have been stopped. One establishment politician simply made a poor decision and sold out his country’s long-term future for his own short-term gain. Had he understood the consequences of this course of action—for instance, if he had studied a book of political history like this one—then perhaps he would have chosen differently.
Themes
This pattern has repeated itself throughout history, with outsider figures like Hitler, Brazilian dictator Getúlio Vargas, Fujimori, and Chávez. Political elites gave them all power in the hopes of preserving order—but they created autocracies instead. For example, Hitler led a failed coup attempt in 1923, went to jail, and then founded the Nazi Party. In the 1930s, Germany faced polarization and economic crisis. President Paul von Hindenburg tried naming a series of new chancellors to lead the parliament, but all failed. Instead, conservatives proposed Adolf Hitler—whom they hated, but wrongly believed they could restrain.
The historical pattern that Levitsky and Ziblatt cite is significant because it shows that there’s a structural weakness in all democracies that their citizens and leaders must watch out for. Namely, establishment forces can try to win power by appealing to anti-democratic forces—and then lose control of those forces. The long gap between Hitler’s imprisonment and his rise to power further shows why democracy’s defenders should always be vigilant. For years, Hitler was considered a fringe extremist with no chance at winning power. But his alliance with mainstream conservatives turned him into a legitimate political contender.
Themes
Like in Italy, German politicians tried to resolve a crisis by making a “fateful alliance” with a popular outsider. They hoped to benefit from the outsider’s popularity, without accepting their radical ideas. This “devil’s bargain” tends to fail: instead of bringing the outsider to the establishment’s side, it often gives the outsider the political legitimacy they need to win. Back in Italy, the Italian prime minister faced economic and political crises in 1921. He organized early elections and allied with Mussolini’s Fascists. Their alliance lost—but it gave the Fascists political legitimacy.
Like the Horse asking the Hunter for help in Aesop’s fable, the Italian and German establishments thought they were controlling Mussolini and Hitler—when it was actually the other way around. They sold out their long-term wellbeing for short-term political gains. Not only did democracy crumble in the establishment parties’ countries, but their own prospects also dimmed over time. Levitsky and Ziblatt clearly hope that present and future politicians will see this pattern and steer clear of charismatic, popular, anti-democratic candidates.
Themes
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Chávez’s rise to power in stable, democratic Venezuela followed the same pattern. Declining oil prices threatened the country’s economy, increased poverty, and caused unrest in the 1980s. Chávez led two failed coups in 1992, but the elderly ex-president, Rafael Caldera, responded by embracing Chávez. Caldera became massively popular and won the 1993 election as a result. He quit his own political party and dropped the treason charges against Chávez for his coup. Caldera assumed that Chávez would eventually fade into obscurity, but instead, he gave Chávez the credibility he needed to win the presidency in 1998.
Chávez and Caldera again follow the pattern from Aesop’s fable: Caldera used Chávez to gain power in the short term, but Chávez manipulated Caldera into handing him anti-democratic power in the long term. Like Mussolini and Hitler, Chávez went from an imprisoned extremist outsider to a serious presidential candidate. This suggests that many politicians still haven’t learned from the pattern that Mussolini and Hitler set.
Themes
Hitler, Mussolini, and Chávez all rose to power by partnering with establishment politicians who didn’t take them seriously. But many countries have also stopped such demagogues. It’s not because of their citizens’ superior democratic values—the public didn’t support the Nazis or Fascists when they took power, and while most Venezuelans supported Chávez, they opposed authoritarianism. Instead, democracies stop demagogues when political party elites “isolate and defeat them.” In fact, “political parties are democracy’s gatekeepers.”
As Levitsky and Ziblatt argued in their introduction, the real difference between functional and failing democracies isn’t whether populist demagogues arise: it’s whether democratic forces consistently “isolate and defeat them.” Here, the authors specify that elites—not everyday citizens—are primarily responsible for ensuring this defeat. Ironically, then, preserving democracy requires giving party “gatekeepers” the anti-democratic power to override the people.
Themes
To stop wannabe authoritarians, party elites have to identify them first. Hitler, Mussolini, and Chávez declared their ambitions through violence, but many don’t. For instance, Viktor Orbán governed Hungary democratically from 1998 to 2002, but became an autocrat after 2010. Citing political scientist Juan Linz, Levitsky and Ziblatt list “four behavioral warning signs” of authoritarian tendencies: rejecting the rules of democracy, denying opponents’ legitimacy, encouraging (or tolerating) violence, and restricting opponents’ (and the media’s) civil liberties. Populist outsiders, who claim to represent “the people” in a fight on the elite, frequently meet one or more of these conditions. When elected, they tend to attack democracy.
These “four behavioral warning signs” are a straightforward, unambiguous tool for evaluating political candidates. All four “warning signs” revolve around a candidate’s hostility to democracy—or their willingness to seize and maintain power even if it goes against the people’s will. This shows that, when populist outsiders appeal to “the people,” they’re not really talking about the democratic decisions of the people as a whole. Instead, they assert that their followers are the only people who really count. They make empty appeals to the idea of democracy, when they actually want to dismantle it.
Themes
Because democracies can’t stop candidates from running for office, political parties and leaders have to stop them instead. Leaders should keep extremists off the ballot, expel extremist elements at the grassroots level, and refuse to build alliances with antidemocratic parties. Parties should isolate extremists, not legitimize them, and unite to defeat them whenever they stand a chance of winning elections.
Again, democracy is paradoxical: if the people have free reign to elect anyone they wish, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, they will often elect extremists who want to destroy democracy entirely. Political parties can help solve this paradox, but they have to put democracy first and make a constant effort to protect it. When parties stop valuing and reinforcing democracy, Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest, it tends to decline.
Themes
Gatekeepers have successfully stopped extremists several times. In Belgium in 1936, two far-right parties challenged the mainstream Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal parties. The right-wing Catholic Party expelled extremists from its own ranks and fought to win young right-wing voters over from them. Ultimately, the Catholics agreed to ally with their Socialist and Liberal rivals instead of building a coalition with the far-right parties. Similarly, in Finland in the 1930s, traditional right-wing parties gradually broke with the far-right Lapua Movement when they refused to give up political violence. Eventually, they formed an alliance with the Social Democrats to keep the extremists out.
These examples of effective gatekeeping aren’t as famous as instances in which gatekeeping spectacularly failed—like when Hitler and Mussolini took power. But they’re essential for Levitsky and Ziblatt’s readers because they show how effective democracies can and do stop authoritarian wannabes. In both Belgium and Finland, establishment conservatives put the national interest in preserving democracy above their short-term self-interest in getting conservative candidates elected. Of course, doing so was also in their long-term political self-interest because it meant that they could remain the primary conservative contenders and stop extremist movements from supplanting them.
Themes
There are also more recent examples of effective gatekeeping. In 2016, Austria’s traditional center-left and center-right parties faltered in the first round of the presidential election, sending the far-right FPÖ to the runoff election for the presidency against an independent candidate associated with the Green Party. The center-right party endorsed the Green candidate, who narrowly won because of its support. The U.S. also effectively kept extremists out of politics for decades—until 2016.
This recent example shows that democracy is still constantly vulnerable to overthrow, but establishment parties can still protect it by rejecting extremism. Moreover, the Austrian Green candidate’s narrow victory is a reminder that small changes in the electorate can have major effects on the health of democracy. This means that, often, just a few establishment figures can make the difference in stopping extremism.
Themes
