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Chapter 1
Themes
Key
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in How Democracies Die, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
American Tyranny
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms
Extremism and Gatekeeping
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy
Global and Historical Patterns
Summary
Analysis
In Philip Roth’s novel The Plot Against America, the media-savvy aviator, political outsider, and Nazi sympathizer Charles Lindbergh gets elected president in the 1930s, causing widespread violence around the country. Many people have compared the novel to the 2016 election, which leads Levitsky and Ziblatt to ask why something like this didn’t happen in the 1930s, during the Great Depression.
Lindbergh and Trump were both charismatic outsiders with enough name recognition to immediately become major national contenders and extreme enough views to seriously threaten American democracy. Of course, The Plot Against America therefore also represents one possible future for the United States. Levitsky and Ziblatt compare 2016 to the 1930s because both were times of deep political crisis. Their point is that, despite these crises, party gatekeepers did their job in the 1930s but not in 2016.
Themes
There have been right-wing extremists in the U.S. for centuries. Just in the 1930s, the pro-fascist priest Father Charles Coughlin reached forty million Americans per week via his radio show, and Louisiana governor Huey Long ran his state like a dictatorship, disregarding the state constitution and bribing officials left and right to get his way. Joseph McCarthy, the senator who blacklisted and censored alleged communists in the 1950s, was also extremely popular. In 1968 and 1972, the segregationist Alabama governor George Wallace ran for president on a racist, anti-democratic platform, supporting violence and deriding the Constitution. It’s been common for such figures to get 30-40% support in the U.S. Only political party gatekeepers have prevented them from winning power.
Again, the mere presence of popular extremist demagogues doesn’t say much about a democracy’s health—but their ability to gain power does. Coughlin, Long, McCarthy, and Wallace were all popular, all had clear authoritarian tendencies, and all likely would have threatened democracy if they won national office. But successful gatekeeping stopped them. Their failures bolster Levitsky and Ziblatt’s thesis in this chapter: something changed between the 1960s and the 2010s that prevented gatekeeping from successfully stopping Donald Trump. Specifically, this involves changes in party nomination processes.
Themes
During the 1920 Republican National Convention, after four days of deadlock in the vote for a presidential nominee, party leaders chose the longshot candidate Warren G. Harding in a backroom deal. While such backroom dealing is anti-democratic, it’s also an example of good gatekeeping: risk-averse party leaders prevented “demonstrably unfit” candidates from getting nominated. Parliamentary systems also have gatekeeping built-in, because the elected parliamentarians choose the prime minister. But presidential systems like the U.S.’s are more complicated, because anyone can enter and win an election.
Gatekeeping and democracy are generally opposing tendencies: as voters gain more power, gatekeeping becomes harder, “demonstrably unfit” candidates become stronger, and democracy becomes more unstable. But as gatekeeping grows stronger, elites’ power increases and government becomes less responsive to the people. This was the problem with early 20th century politics in the U.S. In presidential republics like the U.S., the key challenge is how to strike an effective balance between democracy and gatekeeping.
Themes
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The framers of the Constitution recognized the need for gatekeeping. They wanted the president to represent the popular will, but also didn’t trust the people, who often elect tyrants. They originally created the Electoral College to ensure that prominent men would elect the most competent candidates. But in the 1800s, political parties formed, and they became the new gatekeepers. Parties have to both choose the candidates who represent their voters and filter out candidates who are unfit for office. At times, these obligations conflict—like when the popular favorite is a demagogue. Parties always have to balance gatekeeping with openness.
Levitsky and Ziblatt agree with the framers: the greatest threat to democracy can often be democracy itself. To ensure that democracy functions effectively, they think, elite institutions like political parties need to moderate it. Specifically, they have to balance candidates’ quality with their popularity. But if these institutions fail to uphold democratic values, they can also weaken democracy and restrict power to a small, corrupt elite—just like demagogic candidates. Therefore, while outsourcing gatekeeping to specialist political elites can create a more stable and effective system, those elites have to value and defend democracy above all else.
Themes
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American political parties have generally relied too heavily on gatekeeping. Originally, congressmen chose the presidential candidates. Starting in the 1830s, the parties elected delegates from each state to a national convention—but these delegates could vote for whomever they wanted, so they usually chose insider candidates who had party leaders’ support. In the early 1900s, states started holding primaries, but delegates didn’t have to honor the result, so little changed. While this gatekeeping system was incredibly undemocratic—wealthy, well-connected white men held all the power—it did effectively screen out unfit candidates.
Levitsky and Ziblatt aren’t arguing that political party gatekeepers should have as much power as they did in the 18th and 19th centuries, nor use it to limit politics to elite insiders. Instead, they want a balance—parties should be responsive to voters while also effectively stopping extremist candidates. Their history of the presidential nomination process shows how procedural changes have made gatekeeping more or less effective over the last 200 years. In turn, similar changes can make it more effective in the future.
Themes
For instance, Henry Ford—the wealthy, popular, politically inexperienced businessman and antisemitic conspiracy theorist—repeatedly tried to run for public office. At one point, he even led in the national polls. But party leaders rejected him, so he had no chance of winning the nomination. Huey Long died before his planned presidential run, but he would have run into the same problem. Similarly, George Wallace had 40% approval in 1968—the same level as Trump in 2016—but Democratic Party gatekeepers wouldn’t give him the nomination, so he had no chance of winning the presidency. In fact, Philip Roth had a point in The Plot Against America: in the 1930s, Lindbergh was extremely popular and planning a presidential run. But Republican Party gatekeepers made sure that he never had a chance.
Gatekeepers effectively stopped Ford, Long, Wallace, Lindbergh, and many others from becoming 20th century Donald Trumps. These stories aren’t well known today, but their obscurity is actually evidence of how effectively gatekeeping worked during that era of American politics. By stamping out these candidates early, gatekeepers prevented them from ever having a shot at power. Levitsky and Ziblatt continue to raise one crucial question: what has changed since the mid-20th century that made it possible for Trump to win the nomination in 2016?
Themes
However, this all changed in the 1970s. In 1968, after prospective Democratic nominee Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated, the party nominated the deeply unpopular vice president Hubert Humphrey instead. Protestors marched on the Democratic National Convention, the police attacked them, and then fights broke out within the convention itself. In response, both parties restructured the nomination process. Ever since 1972, state primaries have determined the nominee.
The public was right to be concerned about parties choosing unpopular insiders in the 1960s—Levitsky and Ziblatt are not arguing that the U.S. should abandon the contemporary nomination process and return to a system of total elite control. Instead, they’re explaining how an anti-democratic nomination process became more democratic, and how that had unintended, dangerous consequences.
Themes
As a result of these changes, it’s become possible for candidates to win without party gatekeepers’ support. But still, few outsider candidates succeeded from the 1970s until the 2000s. To win primaries across the whole U.S., candidates would need plenty of money, publicity, campaign staff, and powerful allies. In practice, to get all these resources, candidates still need support from the party establishment—political scientists call this the “invisible primary.”
The “invisible primary” is still a form of gatekeeping—party elites might not have total control over the nomination process today, but they still have considerable power to normalize, legitimize, and popularize their preferred candidates. Indeed, this is why establishment politicians’ “fateful alliances” with extremist outsiders tend to be so dangerous.
Themes
