The Federalist Papers argue that checks and balances are essential to preventing tyranny and ensuring stable governance. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton claim that human nature makes the concentration of power dangerous, requiring a system where each branch of government can restrain the others. In Federalist No. 51, Madison explains that ambition must be made to counteract ambition, ensuring that no single branch dominates. The Constitution achieves this by giving each branch overlapping but distinct powers, forcing cooperation while maintaining independence. The executive can veto legislation, but Congress can override that veto with a supermajority. The judiciary can strike down unconstitutional laws, but judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. This interdependence prevents any one branch from gaining unchecked authority, ensuring that government remains balanced and functional.
Beyond limiting power, checks and balances protect individual rights by preventing hasty or oppressive legislation. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton argues that an independent judiciary serves as the ultimate safeguard against unconstitutional actions. Judges, appointed for life, are insulated from political pressure. According to The Federalist Papers, this allows judges to uphold fundamental principles without fear of retaliation. Meanwhile, in Federalist No. 73, Hamilton defends the presidential veto as a necessary tool to prevent legislative overreach. If Congress were to have the absolute power to pass laws, temporary majorities could impose harmful policies without resistance. The requirement that laws pass through multiple branches ensures that only well-considered measures become policy. Madison reinforces this idea in Federalist No. 47, warning that history shows the accumulation of power in one body leads to tyranny. The Constitution’s division of power ensures that government remains a system of law, not of individuals.
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Checks and Balances Quotes in The Federalist Papers
The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.
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Get LitCharts A+It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good.
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, such as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of power, or with a tendency to such accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.
Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various.
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in America, the greatest part of our political evils may be traced to our having neglected the latter.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful matters, particularly where the effect of the measure on the national character is to be estimated, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.
This process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union.
The judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive holds the sword of the community, the legislature commands the purse […]. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.