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Chapter 7
Themes
Key
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in Getting to Yes, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
Effective Negotiation
Negotiation as the Pursuit of Interests
The Value of Working Relationships
Power Imbalance
Preparation and Flexibility
Summary
Analysis
The authors ask what negotiators should do when the other side tries to take advantage of them. Most people simply accept deceptive or unfair behavior as too costly to fix. Others fight fire with fire by using the same nefarious tactics as their opponents, but this does not work either. Indeed, dirty tricks are wrong precisely because they cannot be reciprocal: if one side uses them successfully, they get an advantage, but if both sides use them, negotiation becomes procedurally impossible. The best response to dirty tricks is “principled negotiation about the negotiating process.”
Just as people may insist on positional bargaining in order to try and keep a coercive upper hand in a negotiation, they often use dirty tricks to force concessions and manipulate the other side into accepting an unfair agreement. This particularly happens when someone knows that it would be disadvantageous for them to negotiate on the basis of principles. But these tricks do not work when negotiations are a question of principle, not a battle of will. Indeed, the fact that they only work when non-reciprocal—when their victims do not fight back—is a great advantage for principled negotiators, since it implies that a well-prepared negotiator will never let dirty tricks get the best of them.
Themes
First, the authors ask, “How do you negotiate about the rules of the game?” It’s a three-step process. First, a negotiator has to recognize the other side’s dirty tactic. Then, they have to explicitly point it out, which shows the other party that the tactic is not working and gives them an opportunity to stop. Finally and most importantly, people should negotiate about procedure itself.
The process for negotiating “the rules of the game” is actually almost exactly the same as the process for negotiating interests: recognize them, communicate them, and then address them through a negotiated agreement. Like in Turnbull’s conversation with Mrs. Jones, in fighting dirty tricks, principled negotiation is a dominant strategy: it neutralizes power differences, personal feelings, and manipulative tactics. Simply sticking to principles is likely to save a strong negotiator from these tactics and, often, to bring the other side around.
Themes
The rules of negotiating to produce a wise agreement about procedure are the same as the four basic rules of principled negotiation in general. Negotiators should “separate the people from the problem” by pointing out the issue with a tactic or situation, not the other side as people. When discussing tactics, they should prioritize interests instead of positions and create new procedural options that could be mutually beneficial. And they should settle procedural questions based on objective principles, like by pointing out how negotiations would collapse if everyone used the same dirty tricks. The BATNA to dirty procedural tricks is to walk out of the negotiation, which can be useful in an extreme situation.
The fact that the general rules of principled negotiation can be fruitfully applied to negotiations about the very structure of a negotiation shows that the theory presented in Getting to Yes truly is a universal, catch-all negotiating strategy. Well-prepared negotiators can and should employ the four general rules of principled negotiation in virtually any negotiation context. Notably, the BATNA to dirty tricks is relatively weak, so this implies that sometimes it might be worth putting up with (but not succumbing to) a certain level of trickery from the other side when a better negotiated agreement is still possible.
Themes
The authors then describe “some common tricky tactics,” which fall into three types. The first type is “deliberate deception.” This includes outright lying, which negotiators should preempt by never being too trusting and checking the facts presented by the other side.
Notably, the authors do not focus on what is wrong or counterproductive about lying in a negotiation, nor do they think that this is worth pointing out in an actual negotiation. Although true and valid, this would still be a counterproductive personal attack that does nothing to change the substance or principles at the heart of a negotiation.
Themes
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Some people work through the whole negotiation process, including agreeing on a final solution, before revealing that they do not actually have the authority to make the deal. Then, their boss shows up and starts pushing for more concessions beyond the initial agreement that was made. There is nothing wrong with explicitly asking the other side how much authority they have before the negotiation begins. And if the other side decides to keep negotiating on top of an explicit agreement, negotiators can do the same and continue proposing changes.
Like most dirty tactics, dishonest backtracking is easy to counteract simply by applying the other side’s principles to everyone: if they get to go back on their word, so do you. This tactic only works when the victim decides (for whatever reason) not to fight back. And while fighting back might seem costly in theory, in practice it does not need to create substantial personal conflict—it merely requires standing firm on principles.
Themes
Some people make agreements they never intend to follow, which is how negotiators can put compliance mechanisms in the agreement itself. For instance, if a wife doubts that the husband she is divorcing will pay child support, she can have him offer the house as collateral in the divorce settlement.
Although the very act of signing a negotiated agreement creates a legal recourse for the party who suffers because of the other party’s incompliance, smart negotiators will ensure that the agreement itself accounts for any potential issues with its own implementation.
Themes
But the authors warn that withholding information is not the same as outright lying. Negotiators should recognize that sometimes certain information (like the highest price the other party is willing to pay) cannot be disclosed in order for a negotiation to succeed.
While readers may or may not agree in the abstract that there is a difference between lying and withholding information, in a negotiation situation there is a clear difference between misleading the other side and choosing to maintain privacy.
Themes
The second category of dirty tricks is “psychological warfare.” The physical environment where a negotiation takes place can have a significant impact. As common wisdom knows, people are more comfortable on their own turf—although being more comfortable does not always make one a better negotiator. In some cases, negotiators deliberately make an environment stressful—noisy, too hot or cold, too public or intimate, and so on—in order to pressure the other side into agreeing to a quick but unsatisfactory resolution. In these instances, there is nothing wrong with proposing a change of scenery.
Changing the setting of a negotiation is an underhanded and unjustifiable way of trying to seize more power, but this is what makes it so easy to counteract. Negotiators can always choose to walk away, so they can always also refuse to accept the specific circumstances proposed by the other side. Indeed, it is unlikely that the other side will let the entire negotiation collapse over the simple question of where it is held—and the party that manipulated the environment in the first place probably did so because they believed that the other side would not sacrifice the negotiation over something so irrelevant to the substance either.
Themes
Dishonest negotiators also often make personal comments, purposefully show off their authority, and send subtle cues (like refusing eye contact) in order to make the other side uncomfortable. But stopping these tactics is as simple as pointing them out.
While these intimidation tactics might occasionally help the negotiators who use them appear more powerful and coerce others into taking their side, fortunately, reason and principle are far stronger tools. When counteracting these tactics, it is essential to do so on the basis of principle, rather than responding with a personal attack that escalates the cycle of action and reaction.
Themes
Another common technique is the famous “good-guy/bad-guy routine.” This doesn’t just happen in police interrogations: two negotiators on the same side often act out a conflict and then pretend that their offer to the other side is a reasonable compromise—even when it isn’t. The solution is to always insist on principles.
Like the other intimidation tactics, the “good-guy/bad-guy routine” is based on using emotional manipulation to get people to make concessions based on substance. The better a principled negotiator is at managing their emotions and separating them from the negotiation at hand, the more effectively they can repel the “good-guy/bad-guy routine.”
Themes
Threats seldom work in a negotiation. Instead of leading to an agreement, threats destroy relationships and make others close ranks. A better alternative is a warning—or simply pointing out the negative implications of the other side’s actions. Negotiators should explain their future courses of action as ways of protecting their own interests, never as ways to punish the other side.
Although the difference between threats and warnings may sound like an unimportant technicality, in reality, the former are framed as personal attacks, and the second merely as principled descriptions of a negotiation’s consequences. When making warnings, in other words, negotiators should take pains to show that their motives are not personal.
Themes
There are many effective ways to respond to threats. Some can be ignored, and some can be stopped by stopping the means of communication (like by recording incoming phone calls). Ultimately, the best response to threats is to explicitly point them out and insist on returning the negotiation to questions of principle. However, people should be prepared to respond if the other side does carry out its threats.
Principled negotiators take threats seriously by preparing to meet them but not letting irrational fear or concern determine their decisions. In all cases, responding to a threat should be about neutralizing the tactic and not about counterattacking, which plays into the counterproductive conflict of positional bargaining.
Themes
The third and final category of dirty tricks comprises “positional pressure tactics.” One side can simply refuse to negotiate, like the Iranian government did during the Iranian hostage crisis. It is important to see that this is part of the negotiation—namely, it is a way to pressure the other side to make concessions.
The authors point out that it is impossible to escape the negotiation—even claiming to not want to negotiate is a negotiation tactic and should be treated like any other. When meant literally, it is a negotiator’s way of saying that their BATNA is better than any possible agreement—so to persuade them to negotiate, the other side has to either sweeten the deal or worsen their BATNA.
Themes
When faced with positional pressure tactics, negotiators should ask what interests the other side fulfills by not negotiating and then look for ways to negotiate without sacrificing those interests. For instance, if the other side stops negotiating because their constituents might see them as weak, one can propose continuing the negotiation in secret. Returning to principles, negotiators can always point out what would happen if everyone played dirty.
The basic rules of principled negotiation still apply. Like with any other positional bargaining scenario, the best way to address these tactics is to look past the other side’s declared position about whether or not it is willing to negotiate and instead focus on their interests, which can often be met through solutions besides their stated position.
Themes
Negotiators sometime start with exaggerated demands (like offering $175,000 for a house listed at $300,000) in order to manipulate the other side’s expectations and create negotiating room. This also doesn’t work. First, this only works if everyone is planning to split the difference through positional bargaining. Secondly, this tactic makes others question their credibility. If the other side makes an offer like this, a good negotiator asks them to justify it through principles.
Like all the other tactics considered here, exaggerated demands are predicated on a positional bargaining framework that views a negotiation as a conflict of wills. A principled negotiator does not even need to worry that the other side’s demand is obviously exaggerated, because they will do the same thing regardless: they will ignore positions and ask for principles in order to identify and satisfy interests.
Themes
Some negotiators gradually increase their demands over time, for instance by introducing new issues or reopening settled ones. It can help to call for a break and debate the new demand on principles, rather than hastily agreeing to it.
Like rescinding a previous agreement or backtracking on promises, becoming more demanding over time only gives a negotiator more power in a positional bargaining context, never in a principled negotiation.
Themes
Other negotiators use “lock-in tactics” like publicly declaring that they will accept nothing less than some particular outcome. This strategy is dangerous and counterproductive. Defeating it simply requires openly refusing to take it seriously. This sends the message that the lock-in announcement will not affect the negotiations, but it also makes it clear that the other wide will be able to take back their announced commitment when they decide to come back to the negotiating table.
As with the rest of the dirty tactics presented in this chapter, “lock-in tactics” are really just a brutish attempt to seize power over the structure of a negotiation process, and they backfire when confronted with principled negotiation. Refusing to take the lock-in tactics seriously disarms the very tactic and, in many cases, also forces the side that used them to cope with a poorer BATNA than they had before. For instance, a leader who promises a minimum to their constituents has a worse BATNA once they can no longer blame the other side for refusing to negotiate and paint the lack of agreement as a victory.
Themes
Similarly, when two negotiators are working together, sometimes one of them will insist that they cannot accept a certain agreement because of their “hardhearted partner.” This is easy to spot, and one effective response is to get the agreement in writing before taking it directly to the “hardhearted partner.”
Just like the “good-guy/bad-guy routine,” the “hardhearted partner” routine is based on emotional manipulation and can be resolved by insisting on principles (which do not care if someone is “hardhearted” or not). Manipulative negotiators are unlikely to value personal relationships, so it is important to limit the extent to which personal differences interfere in the negotiation process, all while focusing on the substance as much as possible. Like in the one-text procedure, compiling a document is a reliable way to do so and hold everyone accountable.
Themes
Negotiators sometimes try to use time to put pressure on the other side, such as by intentionally running up against a deadline. This is risky. For instance, during a labor dispute, the workers get more leverage if they refuse to negotiate until the last hours before a strike deadline. But once the strike starts, it is better for management to wait until the strikers lose momentum. In addition to openly pointing out and negotiating about such delay tactics, people can also give the other side incentives not to delay. For instance, they can start looking for other buyers or negotiating with another company.
Time pressure tactics could be viewed as a specific subset of “lock-in tactics.” And like other “lock-in tactics,” they are counterproductive and worsen the BATNA of the party who insists on them. In the strike example, the union’s entire strategy depends upon management taking their deadline seriously. But if management is willing to accept a strike and simply ignores this deadline, then suddenly the workers’ main tactic completely loses its power. Management can do this regardless of whether or not it is even using principled negotiation.
Themes
Finally, there is no real problem with most fixed “take it or leave it” offers, but sometimes they are tricks to seem stubborn and force quick agreement rather than a genuine “final offer.” It can help to point out the consequences of not making an agreement and help the other side save face while continuing to negotiate.
Like refusing to negotiate, “take it or leave it” is often just another step in an ongoing negotiation process. This situation is where knowing one’s BATNA truly becomes useful: negotiators who know theirs will be able to easily discern whether walking away is really a viable option.
Themes
In conclusion, the authors insist, “Don’t be a victim.” There is no hard-and-fast line dividing honest negotiation from bad faith. In fact, that distinction largely depends upon people’s individual values. But negotiators should reflect on whether both sides are genuinely trying to come to a wise agreement. When the other side wants to use stubbornness and deception to their own advantage, negotiators should never let them do it.
Although nefarious negotiators have endless tactics for manipulating others into making concessions, ultimately, none of these tactics will effectively stand up to principled negotiation. This is because all of them depend upon the manipulated party agreeing to conduct a negotiation through positional bargaining rather than on the merits. Some readers might wonder if the authors might be inadvertently writing a guide to manipulation, but in reality they have shown how many manipulation tactics backfire and proven that principled negotiation is always a more effective and efficient strategy in the long term.
Themes
