The Great Influenza

by

John M. Barry

The Great Influenza: Chapter 26 Summary & Analysis

Summary
Analysis
The massive devastation of the pandemic meant that society practically had to reinvent itself, with some institutions finding ways to cut through bureaucracy and others getting bogged down. Despite a somewhat disorganized entry into the war, by 1918, Wilson had used the government to influence just about every aspect of daily life and point it toward the war.
Barry sets the stage for this chapter by looking at the pandemic in the U.S. from the broadest level. By zooming out, he shows how one of the main effects of the pandemic everywhere was change: it forced communities and institutions to adapt to the new circumstances.
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Quotes
Ironically, right as Wilson was gearing up for war, in August 1918 Austria made its first inquiries about terms for peace (which Wilson rejected), and Bulgaria signed an Armistice on September 29th of that year. On October 7, Austria sent a note to Wilson formally asking for peace on Wilson’s terms, but the note went unanswered for 10 days.
Many of Barry’s criticisms of Wilson are presented indirectly. This passage, for example, juxtaposes dates in a way that suggests Wilson was not considering the possibility of peace as seriously as he should have, although Barry doesn’t state that criticism outright.
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Previously, Wilson had spoken about “peace without victory,” something he was desperate to avoid. He believed in fighting ruthlessly. Perhaps this was why his government didn’t even acknowledge the virus, because it was still so focused on war. This had consequences: when Gorgas raised a warning at Camp Devens that soldiers shouldn’t be transferred between camps to contain the spread, his superiors ignored him and kept moving men around as usual. One camp provost marshal canceled the draft, likely saving many lives, but most others in the army decided that lives lost to the pandemic were an acceptable cost.
Once again, political calculations played a role in the response to the virus, with unfortunate results. As Barry has noted previously, this single-minded focus on war wasn’t even good for the war, since the spread of the virus often disrupted vital operations. The fact that some army leaders chose to simply accept pandemic losses highlights the cruelty of war and also shows that such cruelty took many forms that extended well beyond the battlefield.
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While the army continued to ignore warnings from its own medical advisors, it did eventually make some concessions, preventing men with influenza symptoms from sailing to Europe. But the quarantine of the sick men wasn’t total, and they still often spread the virus when they went to public places, like when they ate in mess halls. Even on the ships, which were supposedly free of men with symptoms, outbreaks frequently occurred. In such cases, the ships usually still went ahead to Europe instead of turning back to go home.
This passage shows how sometimes half-measures and compromises are little better than inaction. Nature and viruses don’t negotiate, and so the army’s partial attempts to stop the pandemic were largely ineffective. While Barry praises the potential of strong institutions elsewhere, here he demonstrates how slow-to-change institutions like the army can cause real damage by preserving an unhealthy status quo.
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The situation in France was nearly as bad. Influenza hit American troops so hard that some hospitals had to close. Still, Wilson didn’t speak publicly about the disease, even as he took private meetings. Despite receiving warnings from advisors that it was dangerous to keep shipping men overseas, given the pandemic, Wilson didn’t stop doing so. In early October, he sided with a general who believed soldiers who died in transport were giving a noble sacrifice, just like those on a battlefield. Transport of soldiers to Europe continued, even though the war would end in a month and Germany was already starting to ask about peace.
Again, Barry does not directly criticize Wilson’s actions, but he presents them in a way that makes them seem potentially callous and cynical. The fact that World War I was so close to ending suggests that perhaps American soldiers weren’t urgently needed at this point and that soldiers’ spread of the virus caused suffering that could have been avoided. This passage highlights the dangers of nationalism and of inflexible leadership.
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Wilson expressed even less concern for citizens suffering from the pandemic, even in private. Most of the people Wilson appointed took no interest in public health, and Surgeon General Rupert Blue’s peers considered him a “lightweight,” not taking any decisive action against the pandemic. Blue reached his powerful position through an early success controlling plague in rodents in San Francisco, which helped his powerful friends to support his future endeavors.
In contrast to institutions like Johns Hopkins and the Rockefeller Institute, Wilson’s administration did not hire the most capable candidates to run things. While personal relationships play a role even in more successful scientific institutions, Rupert Blue was an example of what happened when these personal relationships overshadowed actual success (or lack of it).
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As a surgeon general during a pandemic, Blue was ineffective, actually blocking relevant research at one point because he believed it was “not immediately necessary to the enforcement of the law.” The Public Health Service was late to acknowledge the influenza pandemic, and those working under Blue in the office were seldom any better than he was. On September 22, his office finally put out guidelines to avoid influenza, but they were general and didn’t provide clear guidance. Blue was a bureaucrat and seemed to believe that more direct action was beyond the scope of the Public Health Service.
Though Blue was not actively spreading false information to the extent of someone like George Creel, Blue’s narrow-minded focus on research with immediate short-term applications had a similarly repressive effect. The lack of success at the entire Public Health Service shows how organizational problems often start from the top down and how ineffective leaders like Blue can sink whole institutions into inaction and bureaucracy.
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