War and Peace: Volume 4, Part 2: Chapters 1–3 Summary & Analysis

Human beings have an irrepressible need to search for causes, and they tend to latch onto the first plausible cause they can find. Often this supposed cause involves historical heroes. But if we look into the complexity of an event, we quickly see that even so-called heroes are being guided, even if we don’t understand how. We can only understand something about history when we stop looking to individuals’ wills as sole causes. It’s like discovering the laws of planetary movement, which only became possible when people stopped believing that the earth stood still.

After Borodino and the burning of Moscow, historians identify the Russian army’s flanking march beyond Krasnaya Pakhra as the most important event in the War of 1812. This is when the army moved from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road in the direction of the Tarutino camp. Even French historians acknowledge that it was a brilliant move. But it’s hard to see what was ingenious about it—it doesn’t take a military genius to see that an army should move toward the area with the most provisions. And this move could just as easily have proven disastrous for the Russians as for the French.

Furthermore, the flanking march wasn’t the decision of any single person. It proceeded one step at a time and was only considered as a whole in retrospect. At first, the army marched toward Nizhni Novgorod; then Kutuzov learned that it would be difficult to transport provisions across the river Oka once winter arrived. So the army deviated south, and kept doing so, little by little, depending on French movements and the availability of provisions. Only after the army reached Tarutino did people convince themselves that they’d always meant to go there.

Kutuzov isn’t a genius, but he understands the significance of events better than most. He already senses the meaning of the French army’s inactivity, continues to maintain that Borodino was a Russian victory, and avoids useless battles as much as possible. Napoleon, on the other hand, thinks that whatever’s most recently come into his head is good. He sends Lauriston to Kutuzov to request terms of peace. Kutuzov staunchly refuses.

During the month after Borodino, when the French are looting Moscow and the Russians are stationed at Tarutino, the Russian army gains superior strength. Many signs point to the advisability of a Russian attack: the Russians are rested and well provisioned, the French are said to be in disarray, and the Russians long for revenge on the burning of their capital.

Following the abandonment of Moscow, the army has to create new war plans. Previous plans had been dependent on the capital staying in Russian hands. In addition, generals like Bagration have been killed, and Barclay has left his position. As roles are replaced, generals jockey and engage in various intrigues. They imagine they’re conducting the vital business of war, but in reality, the war plays out independently of these maneuvers.

On October 2nd, after the battle of Tarutino, the Emperor writes to Kutuzov. He observes that Kutuzov hasn’t gone on the offensive since Moscow was taken, and in fact, the army has retreated further back. Given that Napoleon is still in Moscow and the French army has broken up into several regiments, perhaps it is time to act—especially before the French have an opportunity to threaten Petersburg. The sovereign reminds Kutuzov that he still must answer for the loss of Moscow.

By the time Kutuzov receives this letter, the Russians have already initiated battle against the French. Earlier that day, a Cossack had stumbled into General Murat’s army while hunting rabbits deep in the forest. This information made its way to the army staff and, despite his reluctance to offer battle, Kutuzov yielded to his inferiors’ wishes and “blessed the accomplished fact.”